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The EU’s New Impact on  
U.S. Environmental Regulation
David A. Wirth
Interactions between domestic legal regimes are occurring all the time, 
with the laws of one country influencing another even within the confines 
of state sovereignty and the limits on national jurisdiction established by 
public international law. Until recently, the direction of that influence in 
the field of the environment was largely from the United States to Europe.
Within the past several years, there has also been an emerging and 
discernible trend—what might be called a “back impact”—of EU policy 
and law on the environmental laws and policy of the United States. During 
this period, regulatory activity in the European Union has intensified while 
the United States has had more of a deregulatory orientation. As a con-
sequence, EU legislation in the areas of environment, public health, and 
consumer protection has begun to have effects within the United States.
Forms of transatlantic interactions between the EU and U.S. legal 
systems range from the passive dissemination of good practice standards to 
more aggressive forms of harmonization, as through free trade agreements 
or upward pressures from the so-called “California effect.” One notable 
instance of back impact is the recent EU initiative on chemicals known as 
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (“REACH”).
REGULATORY INTERACTIONS
David A. Wirth is Professor of Law and Director of International Programs 
at Boston College Law School and Visiting Professor of International Law at The 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. This article is adapted from a paper entitled 
“Un regard extérieur: Back-impact of EU Measures on U.S. Regulatory Regimes,” 
delivered at L’Université du Littoral-Côte d’Opale, Boulogne-sur-Mer, France. The 
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments provided by Frank Ackerman, 
Helen Donoghue, Marc Pallemaerts, and Mark Schapiro on an earlier draft. The 
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Fluid interchanges among legal systems are ubiquitous and largely 
informal in nature. In the area of consumer protection, public health, and 
the environment, it is nonetheless possible to discern certain categories of 
interactions characterized by common structural features. These include 
the adoption of good practice standards by one jurisdiction after imple-
mentation in another. Non-binding instruments or binding treaties may 
serve as fora in which this form of interaction may be more actively pur-
sued, ordinarily with the consent of the jurisdiction adopting the stan-
dard.
Less consensual, and consequently more aggressive, forms of harmo-
nization may also be identified. These include “negative” harmonization 
in fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this setting, one 
state may object to another state’s regulation as excessively rigorous and 
consequently may consider it a barrier to international trade that should 
be removed. Alternatively, a jurisdiction adopting a strict regulatory mea-
sure may have such a large share of a particular market that industry finds 
it impractical or excessively costly to produce an alternative product for 
other markets. This phenomenon, familiar in the U.S. federal system as the 
“California effect,” may also operate to extend the impact of EU regulatory 
legislation beyond Europe.
Consensual Harmonization
One mechanism explaining interactions among legal systems result-
ing in the possibility of convergence, and conceptually the easiest case, 
is simple observation. Through straightforward exchanges of information, 
formal or informal, public policy in one jurisdiction may be informed by 
experience in another. In this manner, there may be agreement on what 
constitutes “good practice” standards that one jurisdiction may copy in 
some measure from another, with or without modifications to suit indi-
vidual circumstances.
On occasion, states may find it useful to coordinate or harmonize 
their policies in such areas as consumer and environmental protection. 
Such an approach has considerable advantages, including enhancing the 
efficacy of individual national responses through coordinated multilateral 
action, minimizing distortions in competitiveness that arise from dispa-
rate national policies, and providing a mechanism for holding other states 
accountable for departures from agreed standards. Within the European 
Union, institutions such as the Commission, the Council, the European 
Parliament, and the Court of Justice, along with EU legislation in the form 
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of directives and regulations, provide a ready forum for harmonization of 
disparate policies among EU member states.
By contrast, there is no single institutional channel through which in-
teractions among jurisdictions on opposite sides of the Atlantic can or must 
occur, and the situation is consequently much less structured. Interactions 
between legal systems may occur as a component of direct communications 
with non-EU member states, through traditional channels of diplomacy. 
Alternatively, international organizations may serve as fora for purposeful 
harmonization of policies. The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) has been particularly active in this field, serv-
ing as a forum for harmonization of national environmental policies and 
laws among its membership of industrialized, market-oriented economies 
through binding decisions and non-binding directives. The OECD, for 
example, has been actively involved for several decades in harmonizing na-
tional policies for testing chemicals.1
Binding international agreements, whether bilateral, regional, or uni-
versal, are also channels through which national policies and laws may be 
harmonized and consequently are another setting in which there may be in-
teractions among legal systems. In the fields of consumer protection, public 
health, and the environment, international organizations typically provide 
a forum for these activities on a multilateral basis. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), whose membership includes all 
states of both eastern and western Europe as well as Canada and the United 
States, has been working for several decades on questions of air pollution 
and has adopted several protocols addressing atmospheric emissions of pol-
lutants.2 Similarly, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has 
served as a global forum for the negotiation and adoption of major multi-
lateral agreements on protection of the stratospheric ozone layer,3 interna-
tional shipments of hazardous wastes,4 trade in chemicals and pesticides,5 
and regulation of persistent organic pollutants.6 Negotiations preceding the 
adoption of those agreements serve as conscious and purposeful exercises 
in coordinating or harmonizing national policies, in part to avoid corrosive 
regulatory competition and in part to solve collective action problems.
Regardless of the degree of formality of the interactions or the legal 
force of the resulting outcome, these efforts at harmonization are all con-
sensual. States typically participate in drafting and negotiating non-binding 
instruments that apply to them, and those “soft law” good practice stan-
dards are ordinarily adopted by consensus. International agreements with 
binding obligations apply only to states that have affirmatively accepted 
them, as through ratification. The numerous opportunities for granting 
the fletcher forum of world affairs94
vol.31:2 summer 2007
or withholding consent in these settings assure that the consequences of 
interactions between legal systems are the result of acquiescence rather than 
pure coercion. That is not to say that all states have the same capacity to 
influence others’ legal systems or to resist the exercise of international lever-
age. But in a consensus setting, that process is at least minimally mediated 
through the affirmative participation of public authorities in states that are 
on the receiving end of external pressures. 
Until recently, most exchanges of this sort in the fields of consumer 
protection, public health, and environmental protection ran primarily from 
west to east, that is from the United States to Europe, especially during the 
flowering of U.S. environmental legislation during the 1970s. EU legisla-
tion on air and water pollution, management of hazardous wastes, and 
environmental assessment, to name but a few substantive areas, was largely 
influenced by the U.S. experience.7 Even today it would be difficult to say 
that as activity in these areas intensifies in Europe, American policymakers 
at the federal level have shown much interest in absorbing lessons from 
the European experience, at least on a national scale. Most of the interest 
in EU regulation has, by contrast, arisen out of the potential for excessive 
stringency in European regulation. 
Negative Harmonization
Situations not characterized by consensus may involve unilateral ex-
ercise of influence, whether intentional or not, which tends to result in 
relaxation of the rigor of regulatory standards. Structured negative harmo-
nization of this kind in the context of free trade agreements, such as those 
adopted under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is 
one of the principal drivers of globalization.
Differences in national regulatory approaches can lead to trade 
disputes, the resolution of which is one of the principal purposes of the 
WTO. If exporters from one country claim that another’s higher standards 
are impeding market access, the question is then whether the higher stan-
dard is a non-tariff barrier to trade whose principal purpose is to protect 
domestic industry from foreign competition or, alternatively, a legitimate 
exercise of a state’s sovereign police power to protect consumer welfare and 
the environment. Assuming a dispute reaches a sufficiently high level, the 
state with the lower standard may seek recourse through litigation initi-
ated through a trade agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism, typically 
among the more efficacious in the international system.
The tension between liberalized trade on the one hand and policies to 
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promote consumer protection, public health, and environmental quality on 
the other is, indeed, an inherent structural attribute of a negative approach 
to harmonization. Free trade agreements achieve their goal of enhancing 
human welfare by limiting governmental interventions into what other-
wise would be a free market. International obligations relating to trade are 
consequently almost exclusively “negative” in the sense that they place con-
straints on governmental action. From an environmental, public health, or 
consumer protection point of view, this phenomenon is the equivalent of 
deregulation—in the sense of reducing the level of governmental intrusion 
in the market—and trade agreements by virtue of their negative obligations 
are inherently deregulatory.
Environmental protection, by contrast, anticipates affirmative gov-
ernmental interventions in the marketplace to offset market failures. 
Obligations in trade agreements proscribe certain governmental behaviors 
that impede trade, while domestic environmental regulations and interna-
tional environmental agreements prescribe governmental actions to protect 
public health and ecosystems. It is important to note that international 
trade agreements, by their terms, do not mandate any minimum standards 
for protection of the environment or human health. Rather, these instru-
ments establish constraints on how states may act if they choose to regulate 
in these areas.
At a more specific level, trade agreements focus on environmental, 
public health, and consumer protection measures as potential impediments 
to international trade. The task from the point of view of trade policy is 
consequently to distinguish between those unilateral measures ostensibly 
intended to promote environmental, consumer protection, or public health 
goals that are legitimate exercises of governmental regulatory powers and 
those that are, by contrast, pretexts for protectionism. This is a very differ-
ent posture from a multilateral negotiation on an issue such as control of 
shipments of toxic waste, which is designed to overcome collective action 
problems by reference to at least some minimal level of international agree-
ment about the nature of the underlying threats.
Transatlantic disputes between the United States and Europe over 
EU-level environmental and consumer protection measures of precisely 
this kind have featured prominently in the agenda of the dispute settlement 
apparatus of the WTO. These include an EU prohibition on the sale of 
imported and domestically manufactured meat and meat products derived 
from cattle treated with growth-promoting hormones,8 as well as a recently 
decided challenge initiated by the United States, Canada, and Argentina in 
2003 to the EU’s de facto moratorium maintained at that time on the ap-
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proval of biotech products.9 The mere threat of a conflict, as opposed to an 
actual dispute, may also act to dampen national regulatory efforts—a “raised 
eyebrow,” biased toward inaction and against regulatory intervention.
Upward Harmonization
In contrast to consensual harmonization, negative harmonization is 
unilateral in nature, with one state’s policy or law exerting downward pres-
sure on another’s. A counterpart phenomenon may also occur, in which 
higher standards buoy up those of others, creating—in contrast to negative 
harmonization—momentum in the direction of greater rigor.
This kind of upward harmonization can occur when a jurisdiction 
with high standards and that commands a very large market makes a uni-
lateral regulatory decision, even one that ostensibly applies only internally. 
If that jurisdiction’s market share is sufficiently large, regulatory require-
ments can affect an even larger area, including those under the control of 
other sovereign authorities. Whether states or private entities, the trading 
partners of a jurisdiction adopting demanding regulatory standards may 
find it disadvantageous to produce products or services that do not meet 
the higher requirements, even if other 
markets have less rigorous regulatory 
standards. The net effect is an upward 
pressure on standards even outside the 
jurisdiction that established them.
In the United States, this phe-
nomenon is sometimes called the 
“California effect,” named for a sub-
national jurisdiction that has been a 
leader in environmental and consumer 
protection. Although home to only 
about 12 percent of the nation’s pop-
ulation, California is the single most 
populous state. It is also the state with the highest gross domestic product 
(GDP), accounting for about 13 percent of the country’s total. California 
is itself one of the ten largest markets in the world, with a total GDP great-
er than that of Canada, Spain, or South Korea. When California regulates 
a particular product or activity, a firm doing business there has a number of 
choices: it may decide (1) to undertake special modifications to its business 
practices just for the California market; (2) to forego sales in California; or, 
as is frequently the case, (3) to alter its products or services offered for sale 
The mere threat of a conflict, 
as opposed to an actual 
dispute, may also act to 
dampen national regulatory 
efforts—a “raised eyebrow,” 
biased toward inaction 
and against regulatory 
intervention.
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in all markets to conform to the California standards, especially if creating 
two product streams would be impracticable or excessively costly.
One good example of this latter alternative is California’s Proposition 
65,10 approved by statewide voter referendum in 1986. The statute pro-
hibits exposing the public without warning to carcinogens or reproductive 
toxins, as in consumer products or food, unless the risk of a lifetime of ex-
posure is insignificant. This requirement states a presumption that labels are 
required unless demonstrated to be unnecessary. Because of the “California 
effect” resulting from the size of the market in that state, Proposition 65 
has had a nationwide impact on manufacturers that have had an incen-
tive to reformulate all their products to avoid the labeling requirements in 
California. More recently, in the absence of a coordinated federal policy 
and after the Bush administration gave notice of its intention not to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol, California has recently adopted its own legislation to 
reduce industrial carbon dioxide emissions by 25 percent by 2020.11 This 
action, the first of its kind undertaken by a constituent state of the United 
States, is also expected to have a nationwide effect.
A similar phenomenon can operate on the international level.12 
Historically, in the fields of environment, public health, and consumer 
protection, it has been U.S. standards that have exerted upward pressure 
on public policy in Europe. So, for instance, in the mid-1980s, the United 
States was the first country to adopt requirements for a regime of “prior 
informed consent” (PIC), prohibiting exports of hazardous wastes unless 
the government of the state of import has expressly agreed to accept those 
shipments. This in turn led to the Basel Convention,13 which extends a PIC 
regime potentially universally. 
The United States continues to regulate in ways that have impacts 
on public policy in other jurisdictions, as in post-Enron securities legis-
lation.14 In environmental, public health, and consumer protection regu-
lation, however, the past two decades or so have seen a slowing of U.S. 
regulatory activity, with an emphasis on outright deregulation in some 
situations. Meanwhile, polls in the EU demonstrate that the public con-
siders the environment a top public policy priority, and there is substantial 
and increasing support for action at the European level.15 At the same time 
that the U.S. has tended to rely on existing policies or to roll back some 
environmental protections, the European Union has taken the lead in a 
number of areas, such as climate change.16
With its recent expansion to 27 member states, the EU now has a 
population more than one and one half times as large as that of the United 
States and an economy of roughly equivalent size. Consequently, there is 
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at least some potential for legislation and other policy actions taken at the 
EU level to create a back impact across the Atlantic in a manner that would 
have been unlikely as recently as five years ago. This possibility suggests 
that the EU is in the process of becoming an alternative power center in the 
area of social welfare regulation, a development that may not necessarily be 
entirely welcome among certain constituencies in America.
TRANSATLANTIC INTERACTIONS ON CHEMICALS 
Regulation of chemicals draws on each of these forms of interaction 
and illustrates the tensions that can result. In particular, the EU’s REACH 
initiative demonstrates the extent to which European regulation can affect 
the behavior of governments and private parties in other jurisdictions.
Existing Policies
Of the tens of millions of different chemical substances known, about 
30,000 are utilized in industrial processes. Of those, very few have been 
thoroughly tested for human toxicity or adverse environmental impacts. 
Section 4 of the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),17 enacted in 
1976, is representative of attempts to respond to this lack of information 
surrounding the health and environmental effects of existing and new 
chemicals. The legislation was intended to create a regulatory structure 
systematically designed to address data gaps with respect to the toxicity 
of existing substances that “may present an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment.”
Under the legislation, a high-level committee of governmental officials 
identifies priority chemicals for testing based on such factors as production 
data, likely human exposures, and the extent to which existing toxicity data 
suggest cause for concern. After receiving the committee’s recommenda-
tion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 12 months in which 
to require testing of the chemical, and if so, to determine what tests must 
be performed—a regulatory strategy intended to initiate systematic action 
on the part of governmental authorities. If testing is called for, the tests are 
performed by industry under governmental supervision. Implementation 
of the TSCA testing program was uneven at first and the subject of several 
lawsuits in its early stages. As of this writing, the EPA has focused the pro-
gram on a Master Testing List (MTL) that is intended to identify existing 
chemicals that present the greatest need for testing.18
Besides testing existing chemicals, a related public policy strategy is 
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to anticipate and prevent risks from the large number of newly introduced 
chemicals that may harm public health or the environment. Section 5 of the 
TSCA19 sets out a system of pre-manufacture notification (PMN) intended to 
address the problem of the entry of new chemical substances with unknown 
risks into the stream of commerce. That provision requires the proposed 
manufacturer or processor of any new chemical substance to notify the EPA 
at least 90 days in advance of either activity. The EPA may then prohibit the 
manufacture, distribution, use, or disposal of that chemical pending further 
inquiry by the agency. Section 5 also authorizes the EPA to promulgate regu-
lations governing significant new uses of existing chemicals. This provision 
of the statute provides only for notification of new chemicals and does not 
require a prior governmental evaluation before a notified chemical may enter 
commerce. Testing requirements are minimal, and there is no requirement 
that the manufacturer demonstrate safety before a new chemical may enter 
commerce. The burden consequently is on the governmental authority to 
intervene in cases of concern, often based on minimal information.
Pending entry into force of REACH, four principal legislative enact-
ments20 and a variety of other subsidiary instruments establish public policy 
for chemicals policy in the EU. As with the TSCA, current EU legislation 
distinguishes between new and existing chemicals based on a dividing line 
of 1981, when there were approximately 100,000 existing chemicals that 
were then in use. The present EU legislation establishes testing require-
ments only for new chemicals, defined as those introduced on the market 
after 1981, and the burden is on public authorities to intervene to regulate 
risks from chemicals. The distinction between new and existing chemicals 
has consequently favored the latter, reducing incentives for the develop-
ment of less hazardous substitutes for existing chemicals. 
International efforts at harmonization of comprehensive policies for 
chemicals have been modest. The OECD, as noted above, has undertaken 
some efforts in the area of mutual recognition of test data. However, an 
OECD initiative to establish a minimum pre-market set of data in the 
early 1980s failed when the United States did not accept the plan, largely 
because the proposal exceeded the requirements of existing domestic legis-
lation, principally the TSCA. Under United Nations auspices, an ambitious 
Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) cul-
minated in an International Conference on Chemicals Management held 
in Dubai in February 2006. But the outputs from this effort, like most 
OECD undertakings, are voluntary and directed largely at capacity build-
ing in developing countries rather than regulatory innovation.
Major multilateral agreements regulate trade in hazardous wastes21 
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and chemicals and pesticides,22 but those agreements are intended primar-
ily to protect developing countries from unwitting or illegal dumping or 
shipments of chemicals that have been prohibited in industrialized coun-
tries. Another binding agreement establishes strict, comprehensive regula-
tory limits for persistent organic pollutants,23 but that agreement at present 
covers fewer than 20 chemicals, most or all of which have already been 
banned or severely restricted in the United States and the EU.
REACH
Against this regulatory background, the European Commission in 
2003 proposed legislation to the European Council and the European 
Parliament consisting of a comprehensive new regulatory framework for 
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH), 
which would systematize and strengthen chemical regulation by requiring 
registration of existing and new chemicals.24 REACH has been approved in 
a final vote in the European Parliament and a decision at the Environment 
Council and will enter into force on June 1, 2007.25 
REACH, which contains the most rigorous testing requirements of 
any regulatory regime in the world, requires registration of all existing and 
new chemicals produced or imported in volumes of a ton or more per year 
per manufacturer or importer. Failure to register means that the substance 
or chemical will not be allowed on the European market. The proposal 
covers approximately 30,000 chemicals and is designed to identify those 
that might be carcinogenic (causing cancer), mutagenic (causing genetic 
mutations), or teratogenic (causing adverse reproductive effects), that are 
persistent and bioaccumulate (such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)), 
and at least in certain cases chemicals that might be endocrine (hormone) 
disrupters. The registration process will require the production of basic 
toxicological data, including studies of environmental toxicity, if they are 
not already available. It will also require chemical safety reports that de-
scribe exposures and measures to reduce risks.
The testing regime is graduated by volume, with progressively more 
rigorous requirements for higher-volume chemicals. In response to con-
cerns about the potential impact on small businesses, the final compro-
mise version of REACH imposes only very modest demands on chemicals 
produced in amounts of less than 100 tons per year. More information 
is required for chemicals produced in amounts above 100 tons per year. 
Firms are encouraged to form consortia and to collaborate, reducing costs 
in registration and testing, when they are registering the same chemical. 
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The use of information on tests already performed is encouraged. One of 
the chief issues in the final stages of negotiation on the proposal concerned 
the “substitution principle,” addressing the conditions under which the 
most toxic substances are to be replaced.
A new European Chemicals Agency to be located in Helsinki will 
grant the required registration. A preliminary evaluation of the registration 
dossier will be performed by this agency, which can request more informa-
tion or enforce testing requirements. A more comprehensive evaluation 
procedure can be initiated if it is suspected that a substance may pres-
ent a risk to human health or to the environment. The requirement for 
registration will be phased in, with the chemicals of greatest toxicological 
concern produced in or imported into the EU in the greatest quantities 
subject first to the registration process. For substances of very high con-
cern—and that will be identified through a decision-making procedure 
involving the Agency, the member states, and the Commission following 
entry into force of REACH—prior approval in the form of authorization 
by the Commission will be required. The proposal also provides for pub-
lic access to basic toxicological information, a public policy strategy that 
complements the remainder of the proposal. 
Transatlantic Interactions
Within the EU, REACH is the product of affirmative, consensual 
efforts at harmonization among member states. More to the point from 
the perspective of the present analysis, REACH has been the subject of 
transatlantic interactions that illustrate the dynamics of both negative and 
upward harmonization as products of exchanges between legal systems.
The TSCA, the most closely analogous federal legislation in the United 
States, is considerably less rigorous in its requirements than REACH. The 
TSCA contains no requirement for registration or authorization, and in 
general creates no impediments to manufacture and marketing unless the 
EPA affirmatively acts to regulate a chemical or substance. Although notice 
to the EPA is necessary for new chemicals prior to manufacture, there is no 
requirement for a standard battery of tests, or any tests at all for that mat-
ter. Much of the information submitted to the EPA about new chemicals 
in particular is identified as proprietary and therefore confidential. The 
statute contains a provision designed to create a program for testing exist-
ing chemicals, but that has not been particularly systematic.
The result is that very few chemicals have been regulated under the 
authority of the statute, which relies on a cost-benefit test requiring a 
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finding of “unreasonable” risk. TSCA grandfathered 95 percent of then-
existing chemicals, and even today 95 percent of chemicals on the market 
have never undergone even minimal toxicity testing.26 One of the EPA’s 
major initiatives under the law, a virtually total ban on asbestos, was in-
validated by a court despite ten years of agency work on the regulation and 
hundreds of studies on the effects of asbestos.27 The judicial opinion set a 
very high threshold for meeting the standard for an “unreasonable risk,” 
effectively dampening subsequent regulatory initiatives under the TSCA. 
After REACH, Europe and America consequently present two very 
different regulatory milieus. As a result of these regulatory disparities, the 
executive branch of the United States government undertook a concerted 
effort to block or weaken the proposal after the release of the EU’s white 
paper in 2001. These activities are documented in communications from 
various departments and agencies, including the Departments of State and 
Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the EPA. Those commu-
nications are collected in reports of the U.S. House of Representatives28 
and the Freie Universität Berlin,29 documenting that the executive branch 
in effect adopted as U.S. government policy the position of the American 
chemicals industry on REACH.
As might be expected, those reports and other anecdotal accounts 
describe typical activities associated with a negative harmonization ap-
proach. Those include lobbying EU institutions in Brussels and elsewhere, 
démarches in EU member state capitals, and appeals to weaken REACH 
in non-EU countries including South Africa and Asian countries like 
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. In a more structured set-
ting for encouraging negative harmonization, the United States in a June 
2004 submission to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
identified 59 points of objection by reference to GATT/WTO disciplines. 
Just recently, as the process for adopting REACH was in its final stages, the 
U.S. Mission to the EU sent an electronic message lobbying members of 
the European Parliament with the subject line “REACH Second Reading: 
US Views.” The message concludes, “Attached is our ‘voting’ list on some 
of the amendments you will be voting on tomorrow.”30
REACH is also an international case study in upward harmonization 
of the “California effect” variety, but with the unfamiliar twist that the 
European Union is the source of the upward pressure. While opposing the 
proposal and attempting to weaken it through the U.S. Government and 
its own efforts, U.S. industry also realizes that it is going to have to adapt 
to those aspects that cannot be changed. U.S. exports subject to REACH 
amount to $14 billion per year and are responsible for 54,000 jobs in the 
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United States.31 Many firms that operate in the United States that would 
be affected by REACH are, moreover, multinationals whose activities in 
Europe will be directly regulated. REACH’s requirements consequently 
apply to every major consumer product manufacturer in the world.
There are also less obvious back impacts of REACH in the United 
States. The studies required by REACH, and made public pursuant to 
its requirements, may document previously unknown health effects. 
According to at least one informed observer, that new information will 
force a thorough reevaluation or replacement of the TSCA, the principal 
U.S. statutory authority, within the next three to five years.32 Given rela-
tively vigorous toxic tort litigation activity in the U.S., information gener-
ated or released in Europe is likely to fuel lawsuits brought in America. The 
United States also may well become a repository for harmful chemicals that 
are not allowed into the European market, in effect transforming the U.S. 
into a “pollution haven.”
At the sub-national level, states in the United States are beginning 
to respond to legislation originating from Brussels. California’s Electronic 
Waste Recycling Act of 200333 references the EU’s Restriction of Hazardous 
Substances Directive by name, incorporating its standards by reference for 
the purpose of establishing regulatory requirements for electronic devices 
containing certain heavy metals. In a multiple-tiered “California effect,” this 
state-level statute relying on an EU directive could have the practical effect 
of leveraging the application of European standards for the entire U.S. mar-
ket, all without any formal policy input from the U.S. government.
Effects on Governmental Processes in the United States
A “California effect” driven by public policies adopted not by a con-
stituent sub-national unit within the United States, but from Europe, is a 
new phenomenon in American political and legal life. A “California effect” 
emanating from abroad creates dynamics that may well be familiar to a 
European looking west across the Atlantic, but which have rarely been en-
countered—and to date are grossly underappreciated—by Americans cast-
ing an eye in the opposite direction. 
The closest precedent to the simultaneous operation of pressures for 
both negative and upward harmonization is the case of genetically modi-
fied (GM) foods and crops. The United States has few regulatory impedi-
ments to marketing GM products, but the EU requires prior governmental 
authorization. As a result of EU-level legislation and member state action, 
many new product approvals were blocked after 1998, as a consequence of 
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which a number of products allowed in the United States were prohibited 
in the European market. This situation triggered a successful challenge ini-
tiated in the WTO by the U.S., Canada, and Argentina,34 an example of 
negative harmonization.
At the same time, new requirements for labeling and traceability that 
were not the subject of the WTO challenge were having a back impact in 
the United States, requiring U.S. producers to segment their products into 
two distinct streams, GM and non-GM, to meet the needs of the European 
market35—an example of upward harmonization emanating from abroad. 
The result has been a virtual collapse of the market for U.S. exports of 
corn, and American rice and wheat producers have resisted adopting GM 
varieties for fear of risking a similar fate.36
In short, American public policy is now, at least under some cir-
cumstances, the product of debates occurring in Brussels. U.S. laws are, 
in a sense, being drafted overseas. While this may be a fact of life in a glo-
balized world, and in substance perhaps helpful by tending to encourage 
progressive development of regulatory 
policy in North America, this phe-
nomenon has serious long-term impli-
cations for the process of crafting U.S. 
public policy.
First, and perhaps most obvi-
ously, not every U.S. constituency has 
the resources or the political leverage 
to effectively represent its interests in 
Brussels. As noted in the Waxman re-
port,37 the U.S. government’s position on REACH has been informed al-
most exclusively by the preferences of the U.S. chemical industry. U.S. 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that might have an interest in 
more rigorous requirements have had a negligible impact on the execu-
tive branch’s position. Nor is this constituency, representing the interests 
of non-EU nationals, likely to have much influence directly in Brussels. 
Moreover, many chemical companies which have been active in influenc-
ing the U.S. government in the U.S. are multinationals, with a simulta-
neous presence on both sides of the Atlantic. That means that they have 
direct input as domestic constituencies in both Washington and Brussels, 
whereas at least under some circumstances, the representatives of compet-
ing interests may have neither.
Second, and perhaps even more notably, the process for policy input 
by the United States government in Brussels is radically different from that 
In short, American public 
policy is now, at least under 
some circumstances, the 
product of debates occurring 
in Brussels.
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domestically. The U.S. government exerts an influence in the EU-level pro-
cess in the form of diplomatic representations, which are the product of a 
deliberative process for crafting foreign policy. As such, U.S. public policy 
vis-à-vis the EU on chemicals legislation is established through procedures 
very different from that for an analogous domestic regulatory issue, such as 
the adoption and implementation of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
As “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations,”38 the President and the Executive can 
and do conduct foreign policy with little, if any, involvement from the 
Congress. The process of formulating foreign policy is typically undertak-
en in governmental departments, such as the Department of State, that 
have responsibilities for external relations, and with considerably less in-
volvement with regulatory powers by agencies like the EPA than would be 
encountered on a purely domestic issue. Unlike the process of developing 
domestic regulations, foreign policy is typically elaborated in secret, often 
within security agencies, without notice to the public.
The process of communicating with foreign governments—the con-
duct of diplomacy—is similarly conducted out of the public eye and un-
der a cloak of secrecy and confidentiality between governments. There is, 
moreover, virtually no opportunity for judicial review of foreign policy 
positions taken by the executive branch.39 The result is that there has been 
no requirement for the United States government to explain or account for 
its position to the Congress or the American public. As demonstrated by 
the Waxman and Freie Universität Berlin reports, such a situation is fertile 
ground for capture by special interests, such as the chemical industry, and 
for the exclusion of other constituencies such as public interest advocates.
CONCLUSION
As the European Union continues not only to expand its member-
ship, but also to harmonize its regulatory policies at an ever higher level 
of coordination, EU legislation is likely to have an increasing effect on 
the domestic legal regimes of other jurisdictions— and most particularly 
on the United States. As with REACH, the nature of those interactions 
is unlikely to fit into any one mold. Differences in regulatory approaches 
will most likely continue to give rise to trade-related tensions, with a cor-
responding pressure for negative harmonization. At the same time, as the 
EU is increasingly able to resist such pressures, it is likely to become a more 
effective driver for upward harmonization, as affected constituencies such 
as U.S. industry have little choice but to comply with EU legislation. 
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Simultaneously with each of these considerations, and entirely con-
sistently with both, a de facto convergence in real-world practice even 
without formal harmonization may very well create a climate of greater re-
ceptivity to interchanges between legal systems in a “best practices” mode. 
As the effects of REACH are felt in the United States and the motivation 
for a regulatory rapprochement increases, one might expect to see some 
receptivity both in Europe and America to proposals for more vigorous 
harmonization in multilateral fora such as the OECD or UNEP.
As demonstrated by the example of REACH, regulatory initiatives 
undertaken by our large trading partners can exert pressure on public pol-
icy within the United States and catalyze responses by private parties even 
in the absence of domestic law and regulations. To the extent that the states 
build on this momentum, as in the case of California’s adoption of EU 
legislation as its own, this effect is intensified. Because these dynamics can 
help overcome policy gridlock in Washington in areas such as chemicals 
policy, advocates for more vigorous regulatory interventions in areas such 
as the environment, consumer protec-
tion, and public health might see these 
developments as helpful. While that 
may be the case in the near term, the 
long-range implications are more trou-
bling.
U.S. administrative law rests on 
the implicit assumption that American 
public policy is primarily domestic in 
nature. The prevailing model assumes 
that Congress adopts legislative directives, which sketch in the broad out-
lines of public policy, and that the particulars will be elaborated by the 
executive branch in subsequent regulations. Guarantees of transparency, 
accountability, and rationality in governmental decisionmaking accompa-
ny this process at every step, in both the Congress and in executive branch 
agencies. n
ENdNOTES
  1 As demonstrated by the example of REACH, this twentieth-century model is wholly 
inadequate to address twenty-first century realities. To the extent that the United States is 
on the receiving end of international pressures for upward harmonization, as in the case of 
REACH, there will always be domestic special interests that will be adversely affected. The 
executive branch, in turn, can expect appeals to intervene to eliminate or relax the rigor of 
the foreign action. The Congress may be totally unaware of these developments, and the U.S. 
legal system provides few if any entry points for the public or the courts to intrude into what 
is, in effect, the conduct of diplomacy. As a result, the executive branch is likely to experience 
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asymmetric pressures, with its response subject to little or no external scrutiny.
 Situations such as REACH, in which U.S. public policy in effect is being negotiated in 
diplomatic circles rather than debated in public institutions, are already numerous and 
will only increase in number over time. Due to the fact that our governmental structure 
is characterized by a separation of powers, in which the President is diplomat-in-chief for 
the Nation, there are legitimate and potentially serious constitutional considerations to be 
addressed in circumstances such as the REACH example. We nonetheless have no choice but 
to respond to these new but underappreciated challenges, accepting that we live in a globalized 
world and adapting our domestic institutional and legal structures accordingly. 
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